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The Dutch social philosopher and humanist Harry Kunneman refers, in the context of his critical humanistic perspective on contemporary morality, to the notion “horizontal transcend​ence.” (Kunneman 2005). This notion might seem paradoxical in relating the common ideas about transcendence, as that which is beyond the range of human experience or knowledge, to the horizontal interhuman dimension. The horizontal dimension, in other words, appears to contradict the vertical dimension that is inherent to transcendence. In line with this paradox, Kunne​man’s humanistic interpretation of “horizontal transcendence” is often interpreted as one that opposes and rejects the vertical di​mension of religion. IIn his introductory paper to this volume Wessel Stoker  criticizes Kunneman for understanding contem​porary forms of transcendence as horizontal. He suggests to use the terms “radical immanence” and “transcendence as alterity” instead. I wwill show how “horizontal transcendence“ can be seen as—in terms of Stoker’s typology—a form of close to transcend​ence as alterity, but that it does not rule out verticality. 
For Kunneman, the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s notion of transcendence is one of his main sources of inspira​tion. I will also clarify the notions of horizontal and vertical transcendence that Irigaray sketches. In contrast to Kunneman, her interpretation of horizontal transcendence does exclude rad​ical or absolute trans​cendence. , 
Kunneman’s Humanist Concept of “Horizontal Transcendence” 
By “horizontal transcendence” Harry Kunneman aims at de​scribing a humanistic perspective on the future of religion and spirituality.​[1]​ Whereas many humanists, in and outside of the Netherlands, oppose humanism to religious belief, Kunneman seeks for continuity with those lines of thought within the hu​manist tradition that are inspired by religious sources. Classical humanists such as Pico della Mirandola and Desiderius Eras​mus have found inspiration in the Christian tradition. Also, Dutch humanists in the recent past, such as the founder of the Humanistic Association (Humanistisch Verbond), Jaap van Praag, claimed that religious elements have always formed an important aspect of humanist thinking.​[2]​ Recent publications written by scholars from the University of Humanistics in Utrecht show the diversity of perspectives on the relationship between humanism and religion (Duyndam, Poorthuis, and De Wit 2005), and younger humanists seeking values that give meaning to life and aiming at personal development show an in​creasing interest in spirituality (see Van IJssel 2007). Notwith​standing the a- and anti-theistic voices in the humanistic land​scape, it can thus be claimed that many humanists have found and are finding inspiration in different forms of religiosity or spir​it​uality. 
The relationship between humanism and religion or spirit​uality, however, is not the main nor the most important reason for Kunneman to elaborate on the notion of “horizontal trans​cendence.” Rather, the notion continues the critique of contem​porary forms of morality that has characterized his work from the 1990s on (Kunneman 1996, 1998). Kunneman objects to the uncritical absoluteness of autonomy and freedom in contem​porary neoliberal European societies and to the way religion, notably Islam, is pictured in the media as a dogmatic and closed form of faith.
As Stoker notes in his introductory paper, Kunneman sig​nals a gradual shift in present-day society from vertical to hor​izontal notions of transcendence. That does not imply a shift from a society in which religion played an important part to a secular society. Rather, Kunneman associates vertical trans​cendence with dominance, violence, with an almighty God who must be obeyed. As he explains:
The notion of vertical transcendence refers to religious tra​ditions and spiritual frameworks claiming the existence of an absolute power or entity, transcending all human voli​tion and knowledge and demanding obedience to its re​vealed will and commandments. (Kunneman forthcoming: 6).
The examples he names are the Crusades in the Middle Ages; and the violent clashes between opposing versions of Chris​tianity in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. He claims that this premodern conception of religion, under the influence of the development of the natural sciences and the philosoph​ical insights that accompanied it, has given way to the post​modern, and more promising, conception of horizontal trans​cendence. Horizontal transcendence for him implies connecting the name of God with caring, morally involved, loving relation​ships between people (Kunneman 2005: 67). For this idea, he draws on the notions of transcendence elaborated by the Chris​tian philosophers Theo de Boer and Gianni Vattimo and the Islamic theologian Maysam al Faruqi, who all describe im​manent, interhuman forms of transcendence, characterized by openness for the other, human vulnerability, care (Kunneman 2005: 63-68). But apart from these thinkers, he also refers to non-religious sources to describe the hopeful shift that he sees taking place. For instance, he associates horizontal notions of transcendence with anti-foundationalist perspectives in philo​sophy and sociology of science. Just like the above-mentioned philosophers with a religious background, these perspectives abandon all claims of absolute validity, stress the historical con​text and locality of transcendent values. Kunneman explains: 
The notion of horizontal transcendence thus tries to do just​ice to the fact that many contemporary adherents of reli​gious, spiritual and humanistic values are deeply commit​ted to the overriding, “transcendent” nature of these values and to their universal significance as a horizon for practical action, but at the same time are prepared to accept the con​textuality and historical relativity of the specific language, images and metaphors which they use to articulate the meaning and moral import of this horizon”. (Kunneman, forthcoming: 7)
Kunneman, thus, does not understand all religious forms of transcendence to be vertical and does not mean to set aside religious conceptions of transcendence from non-religious ones. On the contrary, he draws from religious sources – as well as non-religious ones - for the notion of “horizontal transcend​ence.” The unconditional concern for the other and the relation​ship to the transcendent as a loving relationship and one of compassion instead of commandment the thinkers he mentions develop do not deny that transcendence comes from “outside,” that it happens to people, and can lead to radical transforma​tions. In other words, horizontal transcendence does not neces​sarily imply that the source of transcendence is human; it can still be divine. In this sense, horizontal transcendence does not exclude verticality. What Kunneman does want to exclude with the notion, however, is the relationship to a transcendent that implies power, commandment, exclusion, and isolation and that does not leave open the possibility for people to sense their connectedness and to relate morally to every other (and not only to the ones who believe in the same transcendent absolute). His works, in other words, mean to exclude the danger that is in​herent in religion, and in secular value systems, of making the transcendent absolute and exclusive.
Before I elucidate further on the notion of “horizontal transcendence,” let me say something else on the shift from ver​tical to horizontal transcendence that Kunneman sees taking place in contemporary forms of religion, philosophy and the sciences. What is the status of this shift? The shift that Kun​neman envisions is not simply a description of a phenomenon that is taking place. Rather, he concentrates on the signs of hope he foresees in contemporary society. His work is not only a so​cial critique but brings to attention the small beams of light that are present as well. Horizontal transcendence is one of these beams of light that Kunneman concentrates on in order to sketch a possible alternative morality.
Horizon of Values
Kunneman’s notion of “horizontal transcendence” is a rework​ing of the moral horizon that Charles Taylor describes in Sour​ces of the Self and of the notions of God and the divine that Luce Irigaray develops in her later works (1996, 2002a, 2004; see also Halsema 2010). Kunneman takes his point of departure in Irigaray’s “transcendence as alterity,” and relates it to Taylor’s “horizon of values.” In his interpretation, horizontal transcend​ence mainly applies to the horizon of values; from Irigaray he takes over the ethical appeal to respect the other. 
Kunneman refers to the definition of transcendence that Irigaray brings into play in her later works (Irigaray 1996, 2002b, 2004). For her, it is the other that is presumed to be transcend​ent to the self, rather than an abstract notion of God. Transcend​ence for Irigaray is thus incarnated in the other’s otherness (Kunneman 2005: 71). In the following section, I will eluci​date Irigaray’s notion of horizontal transcendence and explain the differences between her and Kunneman’s interpret​tation; here I will just mention Kunneman’s use of her notion. For Kunneman trans​cendence as alterity implies, in the first place, that persons can​not be substituted for one another: my father, mother, sister, partner, friend are irreplaceable. In the second place, it means that the other does not coincide with our wishes, desires, or ex​pectations. The other forms an “excess” of our wishes and long​ings and is in a sense unknowable. Kunne​man makes clear that, for Irigaray, the other’s trans​cendence gives rise to an ethical at​titude of respect for the other, of re​cognition of the other, and to understanding the self-other re​lationship as one between two beings with an insurmountable intermediate space.
Kunneman claims that the notion “horizontal” has a double significance. On the one hand, it refers to horizontal relationships between embodied people who do not rise above one another but are capable of bearing and welcoming their differences. On the oth​er hand, it signifies the horizon of transcendent values that have an orienting role in their lives and the impossibility of making that horizon a firm and secure foundation of absolute values (Kunneman 2005: 72). The latter is worked out with the help of Taylor. In his analysis of hori​zontal transcendence, Kunneman brings the transcendence of the other and the trans​cendent horizon of values together: he combines the plurality of narrative frames of meaning that surround the individual no​tions of “the good life” in society (the Taylorian horizons of val​ues) with the Irigarayian moral capacity to look beyond the lim​itations of one’s own horizon or narrative framework and per​ceive the other as other.
Kunneman refers to the first part of Taylor’s Sources of the Self, in which the latter develops the idea that the self is embed​ded within a moral framework. Taylor speaks here of “hyper​goods.” These are higher-order goods that are “not only in​com​parably more important than others but provide the stand​point from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about” (Taylor 1989: 63). Hypergoods provide the standard by which we judge our other ends. Unlike Taylor, Kunneman speaks of “transcendent values” in this respect (Kunneman 2005: 72). Hypergoods for Taylor go together with “strong eval​uations.”​[3]​ Kunneman objects to Taylor’s claim that hyper​goods and strong evaluations are independent of individual wishes and desires. However, he agrees with Taylor that the horizon of transcendent values is not at the disposal of the autonomous in​dividual. The horizon of values includes what he calls a “sensus communis,” a feeling for the whole (Kunneman 2005: 74). Yet Kun​neman also warns against transcendent values that suf​fo​cate the indi​vidual, and do violence to its alterity. Because of the transcend​ent character of some values, which become hy​pergoods, these values can be absolutized (Kunneman 2005: 94). In that sense, every articu​lation of a horizon of values paradoxically limits the limitless space to which it gives access. 
The horizon of transcendent values Kunneman aims at is one that is articulated in various specific, culturally rooted nar​rative frameworks. It can be seen, he writes, as “the transitional area to a limitless space that can be articulated in diverse ways but cannot be exhausted by a single articulation” (Kunneman 2005: 73, my translation). The difficulty is, of course, that people are always related to their specific horizon of values, that in​forms their hy​pergoods and strong evaluations. Embodied em​bedded in​di​viduals have a specific horizon of values that sur​rounds them and that informs their notions of the good life. What Kunneman demands of them is that they develop the moral attitude of not understanding their articulation of trans​cendent values as the only one; in other words, he appeals to the capacity to look beyond the limitations of one’s own value hierarchy.
Religious and Secular Transcendence
Kunneman’s “horizontal transcendence” receives its relevance against the background of contemporary processes of mod​ernization and secularization in Europe that have weakened the traditional meaning-giving frames. The weakening and plural​ization of traditional frames of reference entail that religion and spirituality are viewed more and more as individual forms of giving meaning to life. People find sources for meaning in East​ern traditions, in spiritual practices such as yoga, in Buddhism, in African spirituality, and enrich their own tradition with these new influences, or actualize the traditional Christian sources (think, for instance, of the popular Christian youth churches). Kunneman observes that the contemporary neoliberal stress on autonomy and individualism means that we no longer notice that individual judgments and meanings are always embedded within a larger narrative framework. The values within that frame come from the culture and tradition of which we are a part. With horizontal transcendence he points precisely at these narrative articulations of our moral horizon. Kunneman, thus, describes an alternative to contemporary individualism and to viewing moral norms as individual preferences. “Horizontal transcendence” describes us as culturally embedded and relat​ed to one another, and has a strong normative aspect: it de​mands that we keep an open mind for articulations of values other than one’s own.
The notion of horizontal transcendence thus contradicts the cultural diagnosis of a societal loss of values because of the de​cline of meaning-giving frames such as religion. It shows that religion is not the only source of values and articulates the narrative framework that helps people define what their most important values are. Consequently, the notion opens secular culture up to religion and brings both closer together by mak​ing us aware that not only religious people but everyone is em​bedded in values that are of utmost importance for living one’s life and giving meaning to it. In relation to the typology of transcendence that is central in this volume, Kunneman’s “horizontal transcendence” comes closest to “transcendence as alterity.”Tot de typologie van transcendentie in deze bundel voorgesteld, verhoudt Kunnemans visie zich als volgt: het gaat om een transcendentieopvatting die in de richting ligt van 
transcendentie als alteriteit. 
Irigaray’s Ethical Notion of Horizontal Transcendence 
Luce Irigaray’s works are an important source of inspiration for Kunneman’s “horizontal transcendence,” as  stated above. She develops this concept especially in the articles collected in Key Writings (2004). Her notion of horizontal transcendence can be seen to be humanistic, as I will show. Even though Kunneman’s and Irigaray’s notions of horizontal transcendence are close, there are also points of divergence. 
Religion as “That Which Binds”
By “horizontal transcendence” Irigaray does not so much reject its presumed opposite, vertical transcendence, but rather what she calls “transcendence as ecstasy.” “Vertical transcendence” is sometimes used by Irigaray in a negative sense, as standing for a hierarchical relationship in which the one is subsumed to the other, such as the feminine to the masculine (Irigaray 2002a: 130), or woman to the law of the Father (Irigaray 2004: 27). Al​so, in a rather essentialist move Iri​garay writes that vertical transcendence is the masculine way of securing becoming, for instance, by relating to a God, whereas horizontal transcend​ence is the feminine way: she has to secure becoming through breathing (Irigaray 2004: 147). Most of the time, however, Irigaray considers vertical transcendence in a positive sense, and claims that it is part of the development of the culture of sexual difference that is the aim of her work. Vertical transcendence stands for the genealogical rela​tionship (Irigaray 2004: 190), for instance, in the relationship of mothers and daughters, and is distinguished from the hori​zon​tal relation​ship between women, sisters (Irigaray 1993a: 108). In a broader sense, vertical transcendence refers to the rela​tionship to others of one’s own gender (Irigaray 2004: 14) and is opposed to hor​izontal transcendence as the relationship to the other gender.
What Irigaray explicitly rejects is “transcendence as ecsta​sy” (extase), which implies: “leaving the self behind toward an inaccessible total-other, beyond sensibility, beyond the earth” (Irigaray 199: 104). She associates transcendence as ecstasy with the figuration of God as: “the foundation hidden from sight but offering himself to intuition, placed infinitely far away, above and in front, in his teleological Beauty and Goodness” (Irigaray 1985: 330). The God of the tradition for her is too often under​stood as an “object-entity,” that is, as “radically estranged” from us, “an absolutely unknowable entity of the beyond” (Iri​garay 2004: 171-72). She rejects this figuration of God, which would, in Stoker’s terms, be radically transcendent because she thinks it does not function as horizon for human becoming.
For Irigaray, religion is “that which binds”: it is the gesture that ties earth and sky, body and spirit, in order to allow growth and flourishing (Irigaray 2004: 190). She develops this thought in different ways in different texts.​[4]​ Specifically in “Divine Wo​men” (1984), a lecture for a Women’s Centre in Venice, she de​scribes a notion of God that can be seen as her al​ternative for “God as ecstasy,” namely God as horizon for hu​man becoming (Irigaray 1993a, 55-72). In later works, she sug​gests that it is the relation to the everyday other that supports our spiritual becoming rather than our relation to God (2004). Both give way to Irigaray’s humanist notion of the di​vine, which has human flourishing as its central aim.
“Divine Women” is a close re-reading in Irigaray’s mimet​ical style of Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity. Irigaray adopts Feuerbach’s thesis that God is the essence of humankind seen and honoured as an object outside of us. Whereas Feuer​bach brings religion back to its anthropological roots, Irigaray emphasizes that humankind  needs a relationship to his infinite. She alludes to Feuerbach’s thought that God forms man’s alter ego, is a complement of man him​self, is a perfect man. Such a God is necessary for humankind: 
In order to become, we need some shadowy perception of achievement; not a fixed objective, not a One postulated to be immutable but rather a cohesion and a horizon that as​sures us the passage between past and future …. (Irigaray 1993b: 67)
In our tradition, God guarantees the infinite, which Irigaray interprets humankind’s ideal self.
Irigaray maintains that within the Christian tradition, God forms a horizon for men only, not for women. Her critique of Christianity is that it forgets or represses sexual difference. This implies, among other things, that the Christian tradition leaves woman behind: “she remains excluded from the manifestation of their [the father’s and son’s] faith” (Irigaray 1993b: 26). Re​ligious ceremonies are almost universally performed by men (Irigaray 1993b: 78). What is more, as a mother of Christ, wo​man is only a mediator, without any place of her own. Christ does not relate to his conception, birth, grow, generation, only to “la Parole du Père” (Irigaray 1991: 167). As a result, Chris​tian​ity does not present women with a horizon for becoming (Irigaray 1993b: 63). Whereas men have already defined their mirror, women still need to develop a divine. In this way, Irigaray sexualizes Feuerbach’s claim that in relating to God humankind as man relates to its species (see also Halsema 2008). The notion of God as ecstasy for her is related to the mas​cu​linity of the religious tradition.
Irigaray is not the only nor the first philosopher to speak of the Christian tradition as one dominated by the masculine. Paul Ricoeur, for instance, wonders why the figure of the father has a privilege in imagining God, above that of the mother. In the last chapter of his essay on Freud, De l’interprétation, Ricoeur writes that, without doubt, it has to do with the richer symbol​ical virtuality of the father-figure. The father does not figure as generator, as does the mother, but as giver of the name, of the law. As such, he himself escapes name giving. As an institution of the name, he cannot be named, he is irreal: because he gives the name, he is the problem of the name—as the Hebrews already understood (Ricoeur 1965: 520). In this way Ricoeur clarifies the connection between the masculinity of the God-figure (God as father) and his radical transcendence. Ricoeur’s analysis in which Freud’s notion of identification plays an important role—he starts from Freud’s statement that there is an intimate line between the father complex and believing in God—also puts Irigaray’s endeavour into perspective. Her aim is to secure a religion that is continuous with the body, nature, the mother, and that functions as an ideal for the spiritual be​coming of women. 
Irigaray’s notion of God as the horizon for human and spe​cifically women’s becoming alludes to the horizon of values that Kunneman described but is different from it in significant ways. While both speak of “horizon,” in Irigaray’s case it per​tains to ideals for individual growth and becoming (which implies a notion of horizon as something to strive for, to reach for), whereas in Kunneman it forms the construction that si​multaneously escapes us and informs us, the open and transcendent prospect that consists of our descriptions of “the good.” Irigaray’s notion of horizontal transcendence in her later works clarifies her intentions.

The Alterity of the Other  The Alterity of the Other

In her later works, Irigaray claims that what we have tradi​tionally sought in the relationship to God can also be found in the relationship to the everyday other. “By measuring every subjectivity in relation to a Wholly Other, our tradition has underestimated the importance of the alterity of the other with whom I enter into relation every day” (Irigaray 2004: 189). And: “Our relations between two have been limited to the man-God relationship; we have not sufficiently cultivated them between us” (Irigaray 2004: 181). The notion of horizontal transcendence alludes to the transcendence of the other that I meet every day, and that can replace transcendence as ecstasy. Instead of relat​ing to an outer worldly God, in the relationship to the other that we encounter every day we can meet our limits, learn to respect alterity and become spiritual.
Consideration for the other’s transcendence implies, for Irigaray, accepting one’s own boundaries, notably the limits of one’s knowledge and feeling in regard to the other (Irigaray 2004: 189). The self has to limit its narcissism, its sense of being the whole, of being “all,” if it is to engage with the other. Once we accept our limits, we start respecting the mystery of what escapes our grasp. Irigaray appeals to an ethical attitude of lim​itation of the self, of “not being all”, in other words of finite​ness, which opens the individual up to the otherness of the oth​er. As such, the relationship to the everyday other supports one’s spiritual becoming.​[5]​
The mystery of the other permits women and men “to go along their own spiritual path” (Irigaray 2004: 182). Mystery here refers to leaving part of lived experience open, incomprehensible, strange, foreign, inac​cessible to thought or affect (Irigaray 2004: 182). It is close to what Irigaray describes as “wonder” in discussing Descartes’ passions: a distance be​tween self and other that does not appro​priate the other and leads to asking the other “Who are you?” instead of presuming in advance who or what the other is (Irigaray 1993b: 72-82). It is especially the sexually different oth​er of whom Irigaray writes: “I cannot completely identify you, even identify with you.” “You are irreducible to me, inaccessi​ble in a way”. “I cannot know you in thought or in flesh” (Iri​garay 1996: 103).
Aside from being a concrete other I meet every day and who in that sense helps to experience otherness sooner than an abstract God does, the everyday other also “returns me to my sen​sibility and to a necessary cultivation of it, while still re​specting its tie with corporeality” (Irigaray 2002b: 93). Irigaray claims that it is especially the other of sexual difference who, be​cause of his or her embodied difference, leads to a trans​formation of one’s inclinations and to opening up one’s desire to a trans​cendent dimension. As an embodied being of another gender, the other makes me experience transcendence. As such, this transcendent is “an inscription in the flesh” (Irigaray 1993a: 147). It no longer is a transcendent that is cut off from the body and the sensible but another whose difference remains because the other’s embodiment is precisely one of the factors that makes him or her different from me.
In her latest works especially, Irigaray does not restrict otherness to the sexually different other. Rather, she claims that sexual difference can also bring about openness for other cultures. A culture that cultivates relations of sexual difference will also better facilitate multiculturalism, she holds, and will stimulate relations between cultures, races, and traditions. The reason is that difference in itself is recognized and valued in such a culture (see also Deutscher 2002).
To summarize, Irigaray makes a claim for understanding horizontal transcendence as something that takes place between two embodied people. It signifies the transcendence of the ev​eryday other to the self, which starts by acknowledging the boundaries that being embodied, and thus sexed, imply, on the basis of which we can start recognizing and respecting the other as other (see Halsema 2008; 2010). The notion does not exclude vertical transcendence, at least not the verticality of genealogy that Irigaray presumes. But for Irigaray it does form an alterna​tive to a notion of God as an unknowable entity of the beyond because it can lead to the spiritual development of self and oth​er. 
Transcendence as Alterity: Openess for the Other 
Open for Otherness 
IIn the interpretation of both Kunneman and Iriga​ray, “hori​zontal transcendence” is a humanist and moral notion that aims at human flourishing and growth. For Kunneman, the notion designates not only the horizon of transcendent values that surrounds us but also the capacity to acknowledge differ​ences in the articulations of these values. Irigaray understands trans​cendence to be horizontal when it pertains to the relation​ship to another who is respected as radically different from the self and does not only give way to self-limitation but also to re​spect for the irreducible alterity of the other. 
Both reject a specific sense of “vertical transcendence.” Kunneman does not trade a religious notion of transcendence for a humanist one, i.e. he does not discard religious forms of transcendence but only those forms of vertical transcendence that lead to presuming that values are absolute and exclusive. He rejects vertical transcendence when it leads to power over and dominance. Luce Irigaray rejects a notion of transcendence as ecstasy, which implies a notion of God as outer worldly and so radically transcendent that it does not mean anything to hu​mans anymore. But she holds on to the vertical dimensions in the relations between people, notably in genealogy, transcendence as alterity. 
In both cases, horizontal transcendence refers to values or ideal images that inspire humans. Humans give a voice to these values, but the ideas of the good and of otherness do not neces​sarily originate in them. Kunneman highlights the shared hor​i​zon of values that our specific definitions of the good life are embedded in. Irigaray calls for openness for the other, for re​ceptivity, and for an awareness of limitation of the self. Hori​zontal transcendence in both cases calls for an end to individual narcissism and demands an openness for otherness. It does not exclude the religious but rather includes it, situates it in a broader context and gives it new meaning. ws onveranderd laten.
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^1	  “Horizontal Transcendence: A Humanistic Perspective on the Future of the Religious Past” was the title of a research project (2004-2007) at the University for Humanistics financed by the Dutch Organ​isation for Scientific Research (NWO). Participants in this project were Prof. dr. H. Kunneman, Dr. T van den Ende, and myself. The project aimed at working out the natural, ethical, and practical aspects of horizontal transcendence.
^2	  Van Praag distinguishes faith from religion and claims that hu​manism contains religious elements. For him, religion implies a feel​ing of life that is not focused on a personal God but notwithstanding goes beyond all specific knowledge of reality (Van Praag 1954: 5).
^3	  Described by Taylor (1989: 4) as: “involving discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not ren​dered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.”
^4	  For Irigaray’s reflections on religion see, among others, Deut​scher 1994, Hollywood 1998, Jantzen 2002, Armour 2003, Joy, O’Gra​dy, and Poxon 2003, Mulder 2006.
^5	  For horizontal transcendence as self-limitation, see also Hal​sema 2008 (822-23). The argument of this article is partly repeated here.
